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ABSTRACT
With the widespread use of LBSs (Location-based Services),
synthesizing location traces plays an increasingly important
role in analyzing spatial big data while protecting user pri-
vacy. In particular, a synthetic trace that preserves a fea-
ture specific to a cluster of users (e.g., those who commute
by train, those who go shopping) is important for various
geo-data analysis tasks and for providing a synthetic lo-
cation dataset. Although location synthesizers have been
widely studied, existing synthesizers do not provide suf-
ficient utility, privacy, or scalability, hence are not prac-
tical for large-scale location traces. To overcome this is-
sue, we propose a novel location synthesizer called PPMTF
(Privacy-Preserving Multiple Tensor Factorization). We model
various statistical features of the original traces by a transition-
count tensor and a visit-count tensor. We factorize these
two tensors simultaneously via multiple tensor factorization,
and train factor matrices via posterior sampling. Then we
synthesize traces from reconstructed tensors, and perform a
plausible deniability test for a synthetic trace. We compre-
hensively evaluate the proposed method using two datasets.
Our experimental results show that the proposed method
preserves various statistical features including cluster-specific
features, protects user privacy, and synthesizes large-scale
location traces in practical time. The proposed method
also significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art methods
in terms of utility, privacy, and scalability.
∗This study was supported by JSPS KAKENHI
JP19H04113, JP17K12667, and by Inria under the
project LOGIS.
1. INTRODUCTION
LBSs (Location-based Services) have been used in a va-
riety of applications such as POI (Point-of-Interest) search,
route finding, and geo-social networking. Consequently, nu-
merous location traces (time-series location trails) have been
collected into the LBS provider. The LBS provider can pro-
vide these location traces (also called spatial big data [59])
to a third party (or data analyst) to perform various geo-
data analysis tasks; e.g., finding popular POIs [72], semantic
annotation of POIs [19, 68], modeling human mobility pat-
terns [17, 39, 41, 62], and road map inference [5, 40].
Although such geo-data analysis is important for indus-
try and society, some important privacy issues arise. For
example, users’ sensitive locations (e.g., homes, hospitals),
profiles (e.g., age, profession) [32, 43, 70], activities (e.g.,
sleeping, shopping) [38, 70], and social relationships [6, 23]
can be estimated from traces.
Synthesizing location traces [8, 15, 31, 35, 63, 69] is one of
the most promising approaches to perform geo-data analy-
sis while protecting user privacy. This approach first trains
a generative model from the original traces (referred to as
training traces). Then it generates synthetic traces (or fake
traces) using the trained generative model. The synthetic
traces preserve some statistical features (e.g., population
distribution, transition matrix) of the original traces because
these features are modeled by the generative model. Con-
sequently, based on the synthetic traces, a data analyst can
perform the various geo-data analysis tasks explained above.
In particular, a synthetic trace that preserves a feature
specific to a cluster of users who exhibit similar behaviors
(e.g., those who commute by car, those who often go to
malls) is important for tasks such as semantic annotation of
POIs [19, 68], modeling human mobility patterns [17, 39, 41,
62], and road map inference [5, 40]. The cluster-specific fea-
tures are also necessary for providing a synthetic dataset for
research [29, 49] or anonymization competitions [2]. In addi-
tion to preserving various statistical features, the synthetic
traces are (ideally) designed to protect privacy of users who
provide the original traces from a possibly malicious data
analyst or any others who obtain the synthetic traces.
Ideally, a location synthesizer should satisfy the following
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three features: (i) high utility: it synthesizes traces that
preserve various statistical features of the original traces;
(ii) high privacy: it protect privacy of users who provide
the original traces; (iii) high scalability: it generates nu-
merous traces within an acceptable time; e.g., within days
or weeks at most. All of these features are necessary for
spatial big data analysis or providing a large-scale synthetic
dataset.
Although many location synthesizers [8, 12, 13, 15, 26, 31,
35, 63, 69] have been studied, none of them are satisfactory
in terms of all three features:
Related work. Location privacy has been widely stud-
ied ([11, 25, 36, 55] presents related surveys) and synthesiz-
ing location traces is promising in terms of geo-data analy-
sis and providing a dataset, as explained above. Although
location synthesizers have been widely studied for over a
decade, Bindschaedler and Shokri [8] showed that most of
them (e.g., [15, 31, 35, 63, 69]) do not satisfactorily preserve
statistical features (especially, semantic features of human
mobility, e.g., “many people spend night at home”), and do
not provide high utility.
A synthetic location traces generator in [8] (denoted by
SGLT) is a state-of-the-art location synthesizer. SGLT
first trains semantic clusters by grouping semantically simi-
lar locations (e.g., homes, offices, and malls) based on train-
ing traces. Then it generates a synthetic trace from a train-
ing trace (called a seed trace) by replacing each location
with all locations in the same cluster and then sampling a
trace via the Viterbi algorithm. Bindschaedler and Shokri
[8] showed that SGLT preserves semantic features explained
above and therefore provides high utility.
However, SGLT presents issues of scalability, which is
crucially important for spatial big data analysis. Specifi-
cally, the running time of semantic clustering in SGLT is
quadratic in the number of training users and cubic in the
number of locations. Consequently, SGLT cannot be used
for generating large-scale traces. For example, we show that
when the numbers of users and locations are about 200000
and 1000, respectively, SGLT would require over four years
to execute even by using 1000 nodes of a supercomputer in
parallel.
Bindschaedler et al. [9] proposed a synthetic data gen-
erator (denoted by SGD) for any kind of data using a de-
pendency graph. However, SGD was not applied to lo-
cation traces, and its effectiveness for traces was unclear.
We apply SGD to location traces, and show that it cannot
preserve cluster-specific features (hence cannot provide high
utility) while keeping high privacy. Similarly, the location
synthesizers in [12, 13, 26] generate traces only based on
parameters common to all users, and hence do not preserve
cluster-specific features.
Our contributions. In this paper, we propose a novel lo-
cation synthesizer called PPMTF (Privacy-Preserving Mul-
tiple Tensor Factorization), which has high utility, privacy,
and scalability. Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose PPMTF for synthesizing traces. PPMTF
models statistical features of training traces, including
cluster-specific features, by two tensors: a transition-
count tensor and visit-count tensor. The transition-
count tensor includes a transition matrix for each user,
and the visit-count tensor includes a time-dependent
histogram of visited locations for each user. PPMTF
simultaneously factorizes the two tensors via MTF (Mul-
tiple Tensor Factorization) [34, 64], and trains the
MTF parameters (parameters in our generative model)
via posterior sampling [65]. Then it synthesizes traces
from reconstructed tensors, and performs the PD (Plau-
sible Deniability) test [9] to protect user privacy. Tech-
nically, this work is the first to propose MTF in a pri-
vacy preserving way, to our knowledge.
• We comprehensively show that the proposed method
(denoted by Proposal) provides high utility, privacy,
and scalability (for details, see below).
Regarding utility, we show Proposal significantly outper-
forms the state-of-the-art methods in terms of the following
statistical features.
(a) Time-dependent population distribution. The pop-
ulation distribution (i.e., distribution of visited locations) is
a key feature to find popular POIs [72]. It can also be used
to provide information about the number of visitors at a
specific POI [27]. The population distribution is inherently
time-dependent. For example, restaurants have two peak
times corresponding to lunch and dinner periods [68].
(b) Transition matrix. The transition matrix is a main
feature for modeling human movement patterns [41, 62]. It
is used for predicting the next POI [62] or recommending
POIs [41].
(c) Distribution of visit-fractions. A distribution of
visit-fractions (or visit-counts) is a key feature for seman-
tic annotation of POIs [19, 68]. For example, [19] reports
that many people spend 60% of the time at their home and
20% of the time at work/school. [68] reports that most users
visit a hotel only once, whereas 5% of users visit a restaurant
more than ten times.
(d) Cluster-specific population distribution. At an in-
dividual level, a location distribution differs from user to
user, and forms some clusters; e.g., those who live in Man-
hattan, those who commute by car, and those who often
visit malls. The population distribution for such a cluster is
useful for modeling human location patterns [17, 39], road
map inference [5, 40], and smart cities [17].
We show that SGD does not consider cluster-specific fea-
tures in a practical setting (similarly, [12, 13, 26] do not pre-
serve cluster-specific features), and therefore provides nei-
ther (c) nor (d). In contrast, we show that Proposal pro-
vides all of (a)-(d). Moreover, Proposal automatically finds
user clusters in (d); i.e., manual clustering is not necessary.
Note that user clustering is very challenging because it must
be done in a privacy preserving manner (otherwise, user
clusters may reveal information about users who provide
the original traces).
Regarding privacy, we consider two scenarios about the
MTF parameters: (i) the MTF parameters are made public
and (ii) the MTF parameters are kept secret (only synthetic
traces are made public). In scenario (i), Proposal provides
DP (Differential Privacy) [20, 21] for the MTF parameters.
One limitation is that the privacy budget ε in DP needs to be
large to achieve high utility. We consider that a small ε for
a generative model is extremely challenging when we want
to preserve cluster-specific features (we discuss this issue in
Section 4.5).
However, the MTF parameters can be kept secret (or dis-
carded after synthesizing traces), and only synthetic traces
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Figure 1: Training traces (|U| = 3, |X | = 5, |T | = 9,
|L| = 3). Missing events are marked with gray.
can be output, as in [8]. In this case, i.e., scenario (ii), Pro-
posal additionally provides PD (Plausible Deniability) in
[9] with reasonable parameters for a synthetic trace. Here
we use PD because both SGLT [8] and SGD [9] use PD as
a privacy measure (and others [12, 13, 26] do not preserve
cluster-specific features). In other words, we can evaluate:
how much Proposal advances the state-of-the-art in
terms of utility and scalability at the same level of
privacy.
Regarding scalability, for a larger number |U| of train-
ing users and a larger number |X | of locations, Proposal’s
time complexity O(|U||X |2) is much smaller than SGLT’s
complexity O(|U|2|X |3). [8] evaluated SGLT using training
traces of only 30 users. In this paper, we use the Foursquare
dataset in [66] (we use six cities; 448839 training users in
total) and show that Proposal generates the corresponding
traces within 60 hours (about 106 times faster than SGLT).
Proposal can also deal with traces of a million users.
In summary, Proposal is the first to provide all of the
utility in terms of (a)-(d), privacy, and scalability to our
knowledge. We implemented Proposal with C++, and
made it public [1]. The proposed method was also used
as a part of the location synthesizer to provide a dataset for
an anonymization competition [2].
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Notations
Let N, Z≥0, R, and R≥0 be the set of natural numbers,
non-negative integers, real numbers, and non-negative real
numbers, respectively. For n ∈ N, let [n] = {1, 2, · · · , n}.
For a finite set Z, let Z∗ be the set of all finite sequences of
elements of Z. Let P(Z) be the power set of Z. Let DZ be
the set of all probability distributions over Z.
We discretize locations by dividing the whole map into
distinct regions or by extracting POIs. Let X be a finite
set of discretized locations (i.e., regions or POIs). Let xi ∈
X be the i-th location. We also discretize time into time
instants (e.g., by partitioning it at a regular interval such
as 20 minutes or 1 hour), and represent a time instant as a
natural number. Let T ⊂ N be a finite set of time instants
under consideration.
In addition to the time instant, we introduce a time slot
as a time resolution in geo-data analysis; e.g., if we want
to compute the time-dependent population distribution for
every hour, then the length of each time slot is one hour.
We represent a time slot as a set of time instants. For-
mally, let L ⊆ P(T ) be a finite set of time slots, and li ∈ L
be the i-th time slot. Figure 1 shows an example of time
slots, where l1 = {1, 2, 3}, l2 = {4, 5, 6}, l3 = {7, 8, 9}, and
L = {l1, l2, l3}. The time slot can comprise either one time
instant or multiple time instants (as in Figure 1). The time
slot can also comprise separated time instants; e.g., if we set
the interval between two time instants to 1 hour, and want to
average the population distribution for every two hours over
two days, then l1 = {1, 2, 25, 26}, · · · , l12 = {23, 24, 47, 48},
and L = {l1, · · · l12}.
Next we formally define traces as described below. We
refer to a pair of a location and a time instant as an event,
and denote the set of all events by E = X × T . Let U be a
finite set of all training users, and un ∈ U be the n-th train-
ing user. Then we define each trace as a pair of a user and
a finite sequence of events, and denote the set of all traces
by R = U × E∗. Each trace may be missing some events.
Without loss of generality, we assume that each training user
has provided a single training trace (if a user provides mul-
tiple temporally-separated traces, we can concatenate them
into a single trace by regarding events between the traces as
missing). Let S ⊆ R be the finite set of all training traces,
and sn ∈ S be the n-th training trace (i.e., training trace
of un). In Figure 1, s1 = (u1, (x2, 1), (x3, 2), (x4, 3), (x3, 5),
(x4, 6), (x5, 7), (x5, 9)) and S = {s1, s2, s3}.
We train parameters of a generative model (e.g., semantic
clusters in [8], MTF parameters in the proposed method)
from training traces, and use the model to synthesize a
trace. Since we want to preserve cluster-specific features,
we assume a generative model in [8, 9]. Specifically, we as-
sume that, given a user un’s training trace sn, the trained
generative model outputs a synthetic trace that (somewhat)
resembles sn, while protecting the privacy of un. Let y ∈ R
be a synthetic trace. Let M : S → DR be a probabilistic
generative model that, given a training trace sn, outputs a
synthetic trace y with probability p(y =M(sn)). The syn-
thetic trace y that resembles sn too much can violate the
privacy of un, whereas it preserves a lot of features specific
to clusters un belongs to. Therefore, there is a trade-off
between the cluster-specific features and user privacy.
In Appendix A, we also show the basic notations.
2.2 Privacy Measures
Here we explain DP (Differential Privacy) [20, 21] and PD
(Plausible Deniability) [8, 9] as privacy measures.
Differential Privacy. We define the notion of neighboring
data sets in the same way as [21, 42, 65] as follows. Let
S,S ′ ⊆ R be two sets of training traces. We say S and S ′
are neighboring if they differ from each other at most one
trace and include the same number of traces, i.e., |S| = |S ′|.
For example, given a trace s′1 ∈ R, S = {s1, s2, s3} and S ′ =
{s′1, s2, s3} are neighboring. Then DP [20, 21] is defined as
follows:
Definition 1 (ε-DP). Let ε ∈ R≥0. A randomized algo-
rithm F with domain P(R) provides ε-DP if for any neigh-
boring S,S ′ ⊆ R and any Z ⊆ Range(F),
e−εp(F(S ′) ∈ Z) ≤ p(F(S) ∈ Z) ≤ eεp(F(S ′) ∈ Z). (1)
ε-DP guarantees that an adversary who has observed the
output of F cannot determine, for any pair of S and S ′,
whether it comes from S or S ′ (i.e., a particular user’s trace
is included in the training trace set) with a certain degree of
confidence. As the privacy budget ε approaches to 0, S and
S ′ become almost equally likely, which means that a user’s
privacy is strongly protected.
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Plausible Deniability. The notion of PD was originally
introduced by Bindschaedler and Shokri [8] to quantify how
well a trace y synthesized from a generative model M pro-
vides privacy for the input training trace sn of user un.
However, PD in [8] was defined using a semantic distance
between traces, and its relation with DP was unclear. Later,
Bindschaedler et al. [9] modified PD to clarify the relation
between PD and DP. In this paper, we use PD in [9]:
Definition 2 ((k, η)-PD). Let k ∈ N and η ∈ R≥0. Let
d1 ∈ [|U|] be a training user index. For a training trace
set S with |S| ≥ k, a synthetic trace y ∈ R output by a
generative model M with an input training trace sd1 ∈ S is
releasable with (k, η)-PD if there exist at least k− 1 distinct
training user indexes d2, · · · , dk ∈ [|U|]\{d1} such that for
any i, j ∈ [k],
e−ηp(y=M(sdj )) ≤ p(y=M(sdi)) ≤ eηp(y=M(sdj )). (2)
The intuition behind (k, η)-PD can be explained as fol-
lows. Assume that an input training trace sn is used to
generate a synthetic trace y. Since y resembles sn, it would
be natural to consider an adversary who attempts to re-
cover sn (i.e., infer a pair of a user and the whole sequence
of events in sn) from y. This attack is called the tracking
attack, and is decomposed into two phases: re-identification
(de-anonymization) and de-obfuscation [61]. The adversary
first uncovers the fact that user un is an input user who
generates y, via re-identification. Then she infers events of
un via de-obfuscation. (k, η)-PD prevents re-identification
because it guarantees that the input trace sn is indistin-
guishable from at least k−1 other training traces. Then the
tracking attack is prevented even if de-obfuscation is per-
fectly done. A large k and a small η are desirable for strong
privacy.
We use (k, η)-PD for the following two reasons: (i) it can
be used to prevent the linkage of the input user un and
the synthetic trace y; (ii) two state-of-the-art synthetic data
generators (SGLT and SGD) [8, 9] use PD as a privacy
measure, as described in Section 1.
(k, η)-PD can be used to prevent the leakage of the input
trace sn from the synthetic trace y. However, y may also
leak information about parameters of the generative model
M because y is generated from sn and M. In Section 3.5,
we discuss the overall privacy of PPMTF including this issue
in detail.
3. PRIVACY-PRESERVINGMULTIPLETEN-
SOR FACTORIZATION (PPMTF)
We propose PPMTF (Privacy-Preserving Multiple Ten-
sor Factorization) for synthesizing location traces. We first
present an overview (Section 3.1). Then we explain the com-
putation of two tensors (Section 3.2), the training of MTF
parameters (Section 3.3), and the synthesis of traces (Sec-
tion 3.4). Finally, we introduce the PD (Plausible Deniabil-
ity) test (Section 3.5).
3.1 Overview
Proposed method. Figure 2 shows an overview of the
proposed method. It comprises the following five steps.
(i). We compute a transition-count tensor and visit-count
tensor from a training trace set S.
User un
Time
Slot
Visit-probability 
Vector
1 𝝅n,1Qn,1Transition-probability Matrix
|ℒ| 𝝅n,|ℒ|Qn,|ℒ|
Training
Traces
Synthetic 
Traces
(iii)
(iv)
Time Slot
Lo
ca
tio
n
Next Location
Us
erA
C D
B 𝐑I 𝐑II
Time Slot
Lo
ca
tio
n
Next Location
Us
er
Transition-count
Tensor
Visit-count
Tensor
𝐑I 𝐑II (ii)
MTF parameters � = (A, B, C, D)
(i)
(v)
Figure 2: Overview of the proposed method with the
five steps: (i) computing a transition-count tensor
and visit-count tensor, (ii) training MTF parameters
via posterior sampling, (iii) computing a transition-
probability matrix and visit-probability vector for
each user and time slot via the MH algorithm, (iv)
synthesizing traces, and (v) the PD test.
The transition-count tensor comprises the “User,” “Lo-
cation,” and “Next Location” modes. Its (n, i, j)-th el-
ement includes a transition-count of user un ∈ U from
location xi ∈ X to xj ∈ X . In other words, this tensor
represents the movement pattern of each training user
in the form of transition-counts. The visit-count ten-
sor comprises the “User,” “Location,” and “Time Slot”
modes. The (n, i, j)-th element includes a visit-count
of user un at location xi in time slot lj ∈ L. That is,
this tensor includes a histogram of visited locations for
each user and each time slot.
(ii). We share the “User” and “Location” modes between
the two tensors, and perform MTF [34, 64] for the two
tensors. For a tensor factorization model, we use the
CP decomposition [16] (in the same way as [34, 64]),
which factorizes a tensor into low-rank matrices called
factor matrices along each mode.
Formally, let z ∈ N be the number of columns (fac-
tors) in each matrix. Let A ∈ R|U|×z, B ∈ R|X|×z,
C ∈ R|X|×z, and D ∈ R|L|×z be the factor matrices,
which respectively correspond to the “User,” “Loca-
tion,” “Next Location,” and “Time Slot” mode. A,
B, C, and D are the MTF parameters. Typically, the
number of columns (factors) is much smaller than the
numbers of users and locations; i.e., z  min(|U|, |X |).
In our experiments, we set z = 16 as in [46]. Let
Θ = (A,B,C,D) be the tuple of MTF parameters
(i.e., parameters of our generative model). We train
MTF parameters Θ from the two tensors via posterior
sampling [65].
(iii). Given a training trace sn ∈ S, we compute a transition-
probability matrix and visit-probability vector of the
corresponding user un ∈ U for each time slot. We com-
pute them from Θ via the MH (Metropolis-Hastings)
algorithm [47].
(iv). We generate a synthetic trace y ∈ R that resembles
the training trace sn of user un.
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(v). Finally, we perform the PD test, which verifies whether
y is releasable with (k, η)-PD.
Below we explain the utility, privacy, and scalability of
the proposed method.
Utility. First, the proposed method achieves high utility
by modeling statistical features of training traces using two
tensors. Specifically, the transition-count tensor represents
the movement pattern of each user in the form of transition-
counts, whereas the visit-count tensor includes a histogram
of visited locations for each user and time slot. Conse-
quently, our synthetic traces preserve a time-dependent pop-
ulation distribution, a transition matrix, and a distribution
of visit-counts per location; i.e., features (a), (b), and (c) in
Section 1.
Furthermore, the proposed method automatically finds a
cluster of users who have similar behaviors (e.g., those who
always stay in Manhattan; those who often visit universities)
and locations that are semantically similar (e.g., restaurants
and bars) because factor matrices in tensor factorization
represent clusters [16]. Consequently, our synthetic traces
preserve the mobility behavior of similar users and the se-
mantics of similar locations. They also preserve a cluster-
specific population distribution; i.e., feature (d) in Section 1,
More specifically, each column in A, B, C, and D repre-
sents a user cluster, location cluster, location cluster, and
time cluster, respectively. For example, elements with large
values in the first column in B, C, and D may correspond
to bars, bars, and night, respectively. Then elements with
large values in the first column in A represent a cluster of
users who go to bars at night. In Section 4, we present
visualization of such clusters.
The proposed method also addresses sparseness of the ten-
sors by sharing A and B. In Appendix D, we show that the
utility is improved by sharing A and B.
Privacy. Second, the proposed method trains the MTF pa-
rameters Θ via posterior sampling. As shown in [65], pos-
terior sampling-based Bayesian learning algorithms, which
produce a sample from a posterior distribution given a dataset,
provide DP without additional noise. We use this fact and
sample Θ from a posterior distribution given a training trace
set S. Consequently, the proposed method provides DP for
Θ.
However, ε in DP needs to be large to preserve various sta-
tistical features, including cluster-specific features, as shown
in our experiments (we discuss the reason for a large ε in
Section 4.5). Thus we introduce the PD test to addition-
ally provide PD for a synthetic trace. In our experiments,
we show that the proposed method provides (k, η)-PD for
reasonable k and η.
Scalability. Finally, the proposed method achieves much
higher scalability than the location synthesizer in [8] (SGLT).
Specifically, the time complexity of [8] (semantic clustering)
is O(|U|2|X |3|L|), which is very large for training traces with
large |U| and |X |. On the other hand, the time complexity
of the proposed method is O(|U||X |2||L|) (see Appendix B
for details), which is much smaller than the synthesizer in
[8]. In our experiments, we evaluate the run time and show
that our method is applicable to much larger-scale training
datasets than the synthesizer in [8].
3.2 Computation of Two Tensors
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Figure 3: Two tensors obtained from the training
traces in Figure 1.
We next explain details of how to compute two tensors
from a training trace set S (i.e., step (i)).
Two tensors. Figure 3 presents an example of the two
tensors computed from the training traces in Figure 1.
The transition-count tensor includes a transition-count
matrix for each user. Let RI ∈ Z|U|×|X|×|X|≥0 be the transition-
count tensor, and rIn,i,j ∈ Z≥0 be its (n, i, j)-th element. For
example, rI1,3,4 = 2 in Figure 3 because two transitions from
x3 to x4 are observed in s1 of u1 in Figure 1. The visit-count
tensor includes a histogram of visited locations for each user
and each time slot. Let RII ∈ Z|U|×|X|×|L|≥0 be the visit-count
tensor, and rIIn,i,j ∈ Z≥0 be its (n, i, j)-th element. For ex-
ample, rII1,5,3 = 2 in Figure 3 because u1 visits x5 twice in l3
(i.e., from time instant 7 to 9) in Figure 1.
Let R = (RI,RII). Typically, RI and RII are sparse; i.e.,
many elements are zeros. In particular, RI can be extremely
sparse because its size |RI| is quadratic in |X |.
Trimming. For both tensors, we randomly delete positive
elements of users who have provided much more positive
elements than the average (i.e., outliers) in the same way
as [42]. This is called trimming, and is effective for matrix
completion [33]. It is also necessary to provide DP [42]. Sim-
ilarly, we set the maximum value of counts for each element,
and truncate counts that exceed the maximum number.
Specifically, let λI, λII ∈ N respectively represent the max-
imum numbers of positive elements per user in RI and RII.
Typically, λI  |X|×|X | and λII  |X|×|L|. For each user,
if the number of positive elements in RI exceeds λI, then we
randomly select λI elements from all positive elements, and
delete the remaining positive elements. Similarly, we ran-
domly delete extra positive elements in λII. In addition, let
rImax, r
II
max ∈ N be the maximum counts for each element
in RI and RII, respectively. For each element, we trun-
cate rIn,i,j to r
I
max if r
I
n,i,j > r
I
max (resp. r
II
n,i,j to r
II
max if
rIIn,i,j > r
II
max).
In our experiments, we set λI = λII = 102 (as in [42]), and
rImax = r
II
max = 10 because the number of positive elements
per user and the value of counts were respectively less than
100 and 10 in most cases.
3.3 Training MTF Parameters
After computing R = (RI,RII), we train the MTF pa-
rameters Θ = (A,B,C,D) via posterior sampling (i.e., step
(ii)). Below we describe our MTF model and the training
of Θ.
Model. Let ai,k, bi,k, ci,k, di,k ∈ R be the (i, k)-th elements
of A, B, C, and D, respectively. In addition, let RˆI ∈
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Figure 4: Graphical model of the proposed method.
R|U|×|X|×|X| and RˆII ∈ R|U|×|X|×|L| respectively represent
the approximations of RI and RII by the proposed method.
Let rˆIn,i,j ∈ R and rˆIIn,i,j ∈ R be the (n, i, j)-th elements of
RˆI and RˆII, respectively.
Then RˆI and RˆII are given by:
rˆIn,i,j =
∑
k∈[z]
an,kbi,kcj,k, rˆ
II
n,i,j =
∑
k∈[z]
an,kbi,kdj,k, (3)
where A and B are shared between RI and RII.
For MTF parameters Θ, we assume a hierarchical Bayes
model [57] because it outperforms the non-hierarchical one
[56] in terms of the model’s predictive accuracy. Figure 4
shows a graphical model of the proposed method. For the
conditional distribution p(R|Θ) of the two tensors R =
(RI,RII) given the MTF parameters Θ = (A,B,C,D),
we assume that each element rIn,i,j (resp. r
II
n,i,j) is indepen-
dently generated from a normal distribution with mean rˆIn,i,j
(resp. rˆIIn,i,j) and precision α ∈ R≥0. In our experiments, we
set α to various values from 10−6 to 103.
Here it is important to note that each element in R in-
cludes a transition/visit count, and such a count is called
implicit feedback [3, 28] (e.g., purchasing quantities in item
recommendation). Unlike the explicit feedback dataset that
includes negative values (e.g., integer ratings in [−2, 2]), zero
elements in the implicit feedback dataset should be treated
as 0s rather than missing elements to avoid overfitting [3].
However, the treatment of all zero elements as 0s entails a
high computational cost, especially for large tensors.
We overcome the computational issue by randomly sam-
pling a small number of zero elements and by treating them
as 0s [3, 51]. Specifically, we randomly sample ρI ∈ N and
ρII ∈ N zero elements for each user in RI and RII, respec-
tively, where ρI  |X| × |X | and ρII  |X| × |L| (in our
experiments, we set ρI = ρII = 103). We treat the sampled
zero elements as 0s, and treat the remaining zero elements
as missing. Let IIn,i,j (resp. I
II
n,i,j) be the indicator function
that takes 0 if rIn,i,j (resp. r
II
n,i,j) is missing, and takes 1 oth-
erwise. Note that IIn,i,j (resp. I
II
n,i,j) takes 1 at most λ
I + ρI
(resp. λII + ρII) elements for each user, where λI (resp. λII)
is the maximum number of positive elements per user in RI
(resp. RII).
Then the distribution p(R|Θ) can be written as:
p(R|Θ) = p(RI|A,B,C)p(RII|A,B,D)
=
∏
n,i,j
[N (rIn,i,j |rˆIn,i,j , α−1)]I
I
n,i,j
· ∏
n,i,j
[N (rIIn,i,j |rˆIIn,i,j , α−1)]I
II
n,i,j , (4)
where N (r|µ, α−1) denotes the probability of r in the normal
distribution with mean µ and precision α (i.e., variance α−1).
Let ai,bi, ci,di ∈ Rz be the i-th rows of A, B, C, and
D, respectively. For a distribution of Θ = (A,B,C,D), we
assume the multivariate normal distribution:
p(A|ΨA) = ∏nN (an|µA,Λ−1A )
p(B|ΨB) = ∏nN (bn|µB,Λ−1B )
p(C|ΨC) = ∏nN (cn|µC,Λ−1C )
p(D|ΨD) = ∏nN (dn|µD,Λ−1D ),
where µA, µB, µC, µD ∈ Rz are mean vectors, ΛA, ΛB, ΛC,
ΛD ∈ Rz×z are precision matrices, and ΨA = (µA,ΛA),
ΨB = (µB,ΛB), ΨC = (µC,ΛC), ΨD = (µD,ΛD) are called
hyper-parameters. Let Ψ = (ΨA,ΨB,ΨC,ΨD).
The hierarchical Bayes model assumes some distribution
for the hyper-parameters. We assume each hyper-parameter
Z ∈ {A,B,C,D} follows a normal-Wishart distribution
[10], i.e., the conjugate prior of a multivariate normal dis-
tribution:
p(ΨZ) = p(µZ|ΛZ)p(ΛZ)
= N (µZ|µ0, (β0ΛZ)−1)W(ΛZ|W0, ν0), (5)
where µ0 ∈ Rz, β0 ∈ R, and W(Λ|W0, ν0) denotes the prob-
ability of Λ ∈ Rz×z in the Wishart distribution with param-
eters W0 ∈ Rz×z and ν0 ∈ R (W0 and ν0 represent the scale
matrix and the number of degrees of freedom, respectively).
µ0, β0, W0, and ν0 are called hyper-hyper-parameters. They
are determined in advance. In our experiments, we set
µ0 = 0, β0 = 2, and W0 to the identity matrix, and set
ν0 = z in the same way as [57].
Posterior sampling of Θ. We train Θ based on the pos-
terior sampling method [65]. This method trains Θ from R
by sampling Θ from the posterior distribution p(Θ|R). To
sample Θ from p(Θ|R), we use Gibbs sampling [47], which
samples each variable in turn, conditioned on the current
values of the other variables.
Specifically, we sample ΨA, ΨB, ΨC, ΨD, A, B, C, and
D in turn. We add superscript “(t)” to these variables to
denote the sampled values at the t-th iteration. For initial
values with “(0)”, we use a random initialization method [4]
that initializes each element as a random number in [0, 1]
because it is widely used. Then, we sample Ψ
(t)
A , Ψ
(t)
B , Ψ
(t)
C ,
Ψ
(t)
D , A
(t), B(t), C(t), and D(t) from the conditional distri-
bution given the current values of the other variables, and
iterate the sampling for a fixed number of times (see Ap-
pendix G for details of the sampling algorithm).
Gibbs sampling guarantees that the sampling distribu-
tions of A(t), · · · ,D(t) approach the posterior distributions
p(A|R), · · · , p(D|R) as t increases. Therefore, Θ(t) = (A(t),
B(t),C(t),D(t)) approximates Θ sampled from the posterior
distribution p(Θ|R) for large t. In our experiments, we dis-
carded the first 99 samples as “burn-in”, and used Θ(100) as
an approximation of Θ. We also confirmed that the model’s
predictive accuracy converged within 100 iterations.
3.4 Generating Traces via MH
After training Θ = (A,B,C,D), we generate synthetic
traces via the MH (Metropolis-Hastings) algorithm [47] (i.e.,
steps (iii) and (iv)). Specifically, given a training trace sn ∈
S, we generate a synthetic trace y ∈ R that resembles sn of
user un ∈ U from (an,B,C,D).
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Figure 5: Computation of (Qn,i, pin,i) via MH. We
compute Q∗n from Rˆ
I
n, and pin,i from Rˆ
II
n . Then for
each time slot li ∈ L, we modify Q∗n to Qn,i whose
stationary distribution is pin,i.
Let Q be the set of |X |× |X | transition-probability matri-
ces, and C be the set of |X |-dimensional probability vectors
(i.e., probability simplex). Given a transition-probability
matrix Q ∈ Q and a probability vector pi ∈ C, the MH
algorithm modifies Q to Q′ ∈ Q so that the stationary
distribution of Q′ is equal to pi. Note that Q is a condi-
tional distribution called a proposal distribution, and that pi
is called a target distribution.
In the step (iii), given sn, we reconstruct the transition-
count matrix and visit-count matrix of user un (note that
un is included in sn), and use the MH algorithm to make
a transition-probability matrix of un consistent with a visit-
probability vector of un for each time slot. Figure 5 shows its
overview. Specifically, let RˆIn ∈ R|X|×|X| and RˆIIn ∈ R|X|×|L|
be the n-th matrices in RˆI and RˆII, respectively (i.e., recon-
structed transition-count matrix and visit-count matrix of
user un). We first compute Rˆ
I
n and Rˆ
II
n from (an,B,C,D)
by (3). Then we compute a transition-probability matrix
Q∗n ∈ Q of user un from RˆIn by normalizing counts to prob-
abilities. Similarly, we compute a visit-probability vector
pin,i ∈ C of user un for each time slot li ∈ L from RˆIIn by
normalizing counts to probabilities. Then, for each time slot
li ∈ L, we modify Q∗n to Qn,i ∈ Q via the MH algorithm
so that the stationary distribution of Qn,i is equal to pin,i.
In the subsequent step (iv), we generate a synthetic trace
using (Qn,i, pin,i).
Below we explain the steps (iii) and (iv) in detail.
Computing (Qn,i, pin,i) via MH. We first compute the
n-th matrix RˆIn ∈ R|X|×|X| in RˆI from Θ by (3). Then
we compute Q∗n ∈ Q from RˆIn by normalizing counts to
probabilities as explained below. We assign a very small
positive value δ (δ = 10−8 in our experiments) to elements
in RˆIn with values smaller than δ. Then we normalize Rˆ
I
n
to Q∗n so that the sum over each row in Q
∗
n is 1. Since we
assign δ (= 10−8) to elements with smaller values in RˆIn,
the transition-probability matrix Q∗n is regular [47]; i.e., it
is possible to get from any location to any location in one
step. This allows pin,i to be the stationary distribution of
Qn,i, as explained later in detail.
We then compute the n-th matrix RˆIIn ∈ R|X|×|L| in RˆII
from Θ by (3). For each time slot li ∈ L, we assign δ
(= 10−8) to elements with smaller values in RˆIIn . Then we
normalize the i-th column of RˆIIn to pin,i ∈ C so that the sum
of pin,i is one.
We use Q∗n as a proposal distribution and pin,i as a tar-
get distribution, and apply the MH algorithm to obtain a
transition-probability matrix Qn,i whose stationary distri-
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Figure 6: Generation of a synthetic trace (|X | = 5,
|T | = 9, |L| = 3). Each location is randomly gener-
ated from a distribution in the same time slot.
bution is pin,i. For Q ∈ Q and a, b ∈ [|X |], we denote by
Q(xb|xa) ∈ [0, 1] the transition probability from xa ∈ X to
xb ∈ X (i.e., the (a, b)-th element of Q). Similarly, given
pi ∈ C, we denote by pi(xa) ∈ [0, 1] the visit probability at
xa ∈ X . Then, the MH algorithm computes Qn,i(xb|xa) for
xa 6= xb as follows:
Qn,i(xb|xa) = Q∗n(xb|xa) min
(
1,
pin,i(xb)Q
∗
n(xa|xb)
pin,i(xa)Q∗n(xb|xa)
)
, (6)
and computes Qn,i(xa|xa) as follows: Qn,i(xa|xa) = 1 −∑
b 6=a Qn,i(xb|xa). Note that Qn,i is regular because all ele-
ments in Q∗n and pin,i are positive. Then the MH algorithm
guarantees that pin,i is a stationary distribution of Qn,i [47].
Generating traces. After computing (Qn,i, pin,i) via the
MH algorithm, we synthesize a trace y ∈ R of user un as
follows. We randomly generate the first location in time
slot l1 from the visit-probability distribution pin,1. Then we
randomly generate the subsequent location in time slot li
using the transition-probability matrix Qn,i. Figure 6 shows
an example of synthesizing a trace y of user un. In this
example, a location at time instant 7 is randomly generated
from the conditional distribution Qn,3 given the location x2
at time instant 6.
The synthetic trace y is generated in such a way that a
visit probability in time slot li is given by pin,i. In addition,
the transition matrix is computed by using Q∗n as a pro-
posal distribution. Therefore, we can synthesize traces that
preserve the statistical feature of training traces such as the
time-dependent population distribution and the transition
matrix.
3.5 Privacy Protection
DP for Θ. Since PPMTF trains the MTF parameters Θ
via posterior sampling, it provides DP for Θ.
Specifically, let FPPMTF be our training algorithm in step
(ii), which takes as input the training trace set S and outputs
the MTF parameters Θ. Recall that the maximum counts
in RI and RII are rImax and r
II
max, respectively, as defined in
Section 3.2.
Assume that Θ is sampled from the exact posterior distri-
bution p(Θ|R). Let κ ∈ R≥0 be a non-negative real number
such that rˆIn,i,j ∈ [−κ, rImax + κ] and rˆIIn,i,j ∈ [−κ, rIImax + κ]
for each triple (n, i, j). The value of κ can be made small
by iterating the sampling of Θ until we find Θ with small
κ [42]. Note that this “retry if fail” procedure guarantees
that Θ is sampled from the posterior distribution under the
constraint that rˆIn,i,j and rˆ
II
n,i,j are bounded as above (see
the proof of Theorem 1 in [42]). Then we obtain:
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Proposition 1. FPPMTF provides ε-DP, where
ε = α
(
(λI + ρI)(rImax + κ)
2 + (λII + ρII)(rIImax + κ)
2
)
.
See Appendix F for the proof. Note that a trace y is syn-
thesized from Θ after FPPMTF outputs Θ. Then by the im-
munity to post-processing [21], FPPMTF also provides ε-DP
for all synthetic traces. However, ε in Proposition 1 needs
to be large to achieve high utility, as shown in our experi-
ments. Therefore, we perform the PD test to additionally
provide (k, η)-PD for synthetic traces.
PD test. Let MPPMTF : S → DR be our generative
model in steps (iii) and (iv), which maps a training trace
sn ∈ S to a synthetic trace y ∈ R with probability p(y =
MPPMTF(sn)). Let σ : T → X be a function that, given
time instant t ∈ T , outputs an index of the location at time
instant t in y; e.g., σ(1) = 3, σ(2) = 2, · · · , σ(9) = 5 in Fig-
ure 6. Furthermore, let ω : T → L be a function that, given
time instant t ∈ T , outputs an index of the corresponding
time slot; e.g., ω(1) = ω(2) = ω(3) = 1, · · · , ω(7) = ω(8) =
ω(9) = 3 in Figure 6.
Recall that the first location in y is randomly generated
from pin,1, and the subsequent location at time instant t ∈ T
is randomly generated from Qn,ω(t). Then,
p(y =MPPMTF(sn))
= pin,1(xσ(1))
∏|T |
t=2 Qn,ω(t)(xσ(t)|xσ(t−1)).
Thus, given y ∈ R, we can compute p(y =MPPMTF(sm))
for any sm ∈ S as follows: (i) compute (Qm,i, pim,i) for
each time slot li ∈ L via the MH algorithm (as described in
Section 3.4); (ii) compute p(y = MPPMTF(sm)). Then we
can verify whether y is releasable with (k, η)-PD by counting
the number of training traces such that (2) holds.
Specifically, we use the following PD test in [9]:
Privacy Test 1 (Deterministic Test). Let k ∈ N and η ∈
R≥0. Given a generative model M, a training trace set S,
input training trace sn, and synthetic trace y, output pass
or fail as follows:
1. Let i ∈ Z≥0 be a non-negative integer that satisfies:
e−(i+1)η < p(y =M(sn)) ≤ e−iη. (7)
2. Let k′ ∈ Z≥0 be the number of traces sm ∈ S such that:
e−(i+1)η < p(y =M(sm)) ≤ e−iη. (8)
3. If k′ ≥ k, then return pass, otherwise return fail.
By (2), (7), and (8), if y passes Privacy Test 1, then y
is releasable with (k, η)-PD. In addition, (k, η)-PD is guar-
anteed even if Θ is not sampled from the exact posterior
distribution p(Θ|R) (unlike ε-DP).
The time complexity of Privacy Test 1 is linear in |U|.
In this paper, we randomly select a subset S∗ ⊆ S of training
traces from S (as in [9]) to ascertain more quickly whether
k′ ≥ k or not. Specifically, we initialize k′ to 0, and check
(8) for each training trace in S∗ ∪ {sn} (increment k′ if (8)
holds). If k′ ≥ k, then we return pass (otherwise, return
fail). Let U∗ ⊆ U be the set of training users corresponding
to S∗. Then the time complexity of this faster version of
Privacy Test 1 is linear in |U∗| (≤ |U|). A smaller |U∗|
leads to a faster (k, η)-PD test at the expense of fewer syn-
thetic traces passing the test.
In Section 4, we use the faster version of Privacy Test
1 with |U∗| = 32000, k = 10 to 200, and η = 1 to guar-
antee (k, η)-PD for reasonable k and η (note that ε = 1 is
considered to be reasonable in ε-DP [22, 37]).
Overall privacy. As described in Section 2.2, even if a
synthetic trace y satisfies (k, η)-PD, y may leak information
about the MTF parameters. We finally discuss the overall
privacy of y including this issue.
Recall that given the input trace sn, PPMTF generates
y from (an,B,C,D), as described in Section 3.4, Since the
linkage of the input user un and y is prevented by PD, the
leakage of an is also prevented by PD. Therefore, the re-
maining issue is the leakage of (B,C,D).
Here we note that B and C are information about lo-
cations (i.e., location profiles), and D is information about
time (i.e., time profile). Thus, even if the adversary per-
fectly infers (B,C,D) from y, it is hard to infer private in-
formation (i.e., training traces S) of users U from (B,C,D)
(unless she obtains user profile A). In fact, some studies on
privacy-preserving matrix factorization [44, 50] release an
item profile publicly. Similarly, SGLT [8] assumes that se-
mantic clusters of locations (parameters of their generative
model) leak almost no information about U because the lo-
cation clusters are a kind of location profile. We also assume
that the location and time profiles leak almost no informa-
tion about users U . Further analysis is left for future work.
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In our experiments, we used two publicly available datasets:
the SNS-based people flow data [49] and the Foursquare
dataset in [66]. The former is a relatively small-scale dataset
with no missing events. It is used to compare the proposed
method with two state-of-the-art synthesizers [8, 9]. The
latter, which was recently published, is one of the largest
publicly available location datasets; e.g., much larger than
[14, 54, 67, 71]. Since the location synthesizer in [8] can-
not be applied to this large-scale dataset (as shown in Sec-
tion 4.4), we compare the proposed method with [9].
4.1 Datasets
SNS-based People Flow Data. The SNS-based peo-
ple flow data [49] (denoted by PF) includes artificial traces
around the Tokyo metropolitan area. The traces were gener-
ated from real geo-tagged tweets by interpolating locations
every five minutes using railway and road information [58].
We divided the Tokyo metropolitan area into 20× 20 re-
gions; i.e., |X | = 400. Then we set the interval between
two time instants to 20 minutes, and extracted traces from
9:00 to 19:00 for 1000 users (each user has a single trace
comprising 30 events). We also set time slots to 20 minutes
long from 9:00 to 19:00. In other words, we assumed that
each time slot comprises one time instant; i.e., |L| = 30. We
randomly divided the 1000 traces into 500 train traces and
500 testing traces; i.e., |U| = 500. The training traces were
used for training generative models and synthesizing traces.
The testing traces were used for evaluating the utility.
Since the number of users is small in PF, we generated
ten synthetic traces from each training trace (each synthetic
trace is from 9:00 to 19:00) and averaged the utility and pri-
vacy results over the ten traces to stabilize the performance.
Foursquare Dataset. The Foursquare dataset (Global-
scale Check-in Dataset with User Social Networks) [66] (de-
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noted by FS) includes 90048627 real check-ins by 2733324
users all over the world.
We selected six cities with numerous check-ins and with
cultural diversity in the same way as [66]: Istanbul (IST),
Jakarta (JK), New York City (NYC), Kuala Lumpur (KL),
San Paulo (SP), and Tokyo (TKY). For each city, we ex-
tracted 1000 POIs, for which the number of visits from all
users was the largest; i.e., |X | = 1000. We set the interval
between two time instants to 1 hour (we rounded down min-
utes), and assigned every 2 hours into one of 12 time slots
l1 (0-2h), · · · , l12 (22-24h) in a cyclic manner; i.e., |L| = 12.
For each city, we randomly selected 80% of traces as train-
ing traces and used the remaining traces as testing traces.
The numbers |U| of users in IST, JK, NYC, KL, SP, and
TKY were 219793, 83325, 52432, 51189, 42100, and 32056,
respectively. Note that there were many missing events in
FS because FS is a location check-in dataset. The num-
bers of temporally-continuous events in the training traces
of IST, JK, NYC, KL, SP, and TKY were 109027, 19592,
7471, 25563, 13151, and 47956, respectively.
From each training trace, we generated one synthetic trace
with the length of one day.
4.2 Location Synthesizers
We evaluated the proposed method (Proposal), the syn-
thetic location traces generator in [8] (SGLT), and the syn-
thetic data generator in [9] (SGD).
In Proposal, we set the parameters z = 16, λI = λII =
102, ρI = ρII = 103, and rImax = r
II
max = 10, as explained in
Section 3 (we also changed the number z of factors from 16
to 32 and confirmed that the utility was not changed much).
For the hyper-hyper parameters, we set µ0 = 0, β0 = 2, and
W0 to the identity matrix, and set ν0 = z in the same way
as [57]. Then we evaluated the utility and privacy for each
value.
In SGLT [8], we used the SGLT tool (C++) in [7]. We set
the location-removal probability parc to 0.25, the location
merging probability parm to 0.75, and the randomization
multiplication factor parv to 4 in the same way as [8] (for
details of the parameters in SGLT, see [8]). For the number
c of semantic clusters, we attempted various values: c = 50,
100, 150, or 200 (as shown later, SGLT provided the best
performance when c = 50 or 100). For each case, we set the
probability parl of removing the true location in the input
training trace to various values from 0 to 1 (parl = 1 in [8])
to evaluate the trade-off between utility and privacy.
In SGD [9], we trained the transition matrix for each
time slot (|L| × |X | × |X | elements in total) and the visit-
probability vector for the first time instant (|X | elements
in total) from the training traces via maximum likelihood
estimation. Note that the transition matrix and the visit-
probability vector are common to all users. Then we gener-
ated a synthetic trace from an input training trace by copy-
ing the first γ ∈ Z≥0 events and generating the remaining
events using the trained transition matrix. When γ = 0, we
randomly generated a location at the first time instant using
the visit-probability vector. For more details of SGD for lo-
cation traces, see Appendix C. We implemented Proposal
and SGD with C++, and made it public [1].
4.3 Performance Measures
Utility. We evaluated the utility listed in Section 1.
(a) Time-dependent population distribution. We com-
puted a frequency distribution (|X |-dim vector) of the test-
ing traces and that of the synthetic traces for each time slot.
Then we evaluated the average total variation between the
two distributions over all time slots (denoted by TP-TV).
Frequently visited locations are especially important for
some tasks [19, 72]. Therefore, for each time slot, we also se-
lected the top 50 locations, whose frequencies in the testing
traces were the largest, and regarded the absolute error for
the remaining locations in TP-TV as 0 (TP-TV-Top50).
(b) Transition matrix. We computed an average transition-
probability matrix (|X | × |X | matrix) over all users and all
time instances from the testing traces. Similarly, we com-
puted an average transition-probability matrix from the syn-
thetic traces.
Since each row of the transition-probability matrix rep-
resents a conditional distribution, we evaluated the EMD
(Earth Mover’s Distance) between the two conditional distri-
butions over the x-axis (longitude) and y-axis (latitude), and
averaged it over all rows (TM-EMD-X and TM-EMD-
Y). TM-EMD-X and TM-EMD-Y represent how the
two transition matrices differ over the x-axis and y-axis, re-
spectively. They are large especially when one matrix allows
only a transition between close locations and the other al-
lows a transition between far-away locations (e.g., two coun-
tries). The EMD is also used in [8].
(c) Distribution of visit-fractions. Since we used POIs
in FS (regions in PF), we evaluated how well the synthetic
traces preserve a distribution of visit-fractions in FS. We
first excluded testing traces that have a few events (fewer
than 5). Then, for each of the remaining traces, we com-
puted a fraction of visits for each POI. Based on this, we
computed a distribution of visit-fractions for each POI by di-
viding the fraction into 24 bins as (0, 1
24
], ( 1
24
, 2
24
], · · · , ( 23
24
, 1).
Similarly, we computed a distribution of visit-fractions for
each POI from the synthetic traces. Finally, we evaluated
the total variation between the two distributions (VF-TV).
(d) Cluster-specific population distribution. To show
that Proposal is also effective in this respect, we conducted
the following analysis. We used the fact that each column
in the factor matrix A represents a cluster (z = 16 clus-
ters in total). Specifically, for each column in A, we ex-
tracted the top 10% users whose values in the column are
the largest. These users form a cluster who exhibit similar
behavior. For some clusters, we visualized factor matrices
and the frequency distributions (i.e., cluster-specific pop-
ulation distributions) of the training traces and synthetic
traces.
Privacy. In PF, we evaluated the three synthesizers. Al-
though Proposal and SGD provide (k, η)-PD in Defini-
tion 2, SGLT provides PD using a semantic distance be-
tween traces [8], which differs from PD in Definition 2.
To compare the three synthesizers using the same privacy
measure, we considered an adversary who identifies, for each
synthetic trace, an input user, whose training trace is used to
synthesize the trace, from |U| training users. Then we evalu-
ated the re-identification rate as the proportion of correctly
identified synthetic traces. In other words, we evaluate the
concrete privacy leakage in terms of the number of users at
a risk of exposure analogously to [30]. For a re-identification
algorithm, we used the Bayesian re-identification algorithm
in [45] (see Appendix C for details).
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In FS, we used (k, η)-PD in Definition 2 as a privacy
measure because we evaluated only Proposal and SGD.
As a PD test, we used the (faster) Privacy Test 1 with
|U∗| = 32000, k = 10 to 200, and η = 1.
Scalability. We measured the time to synthesize traces us-
ing the ABCI (AI Bridging Cloud Infrastructure) [48], which
is a supercomputer ranking 8th in the Top 500 (as of June
2019). We used one computing node, which consists of two
Intel Xeon Gold 6148 processors (2.40 GHz, 20 Core) and
384GiB main memory.
4.4 Experimental Results in PF
Utility and privacy. Figure 7 shows the re-identification
rate and utility with regard to (a) the time-dependent pop-
ulation distribution and (b) transition matrix in PF. Here,
we set the precision α in Proposal to various values from
0.5 to 1000. Uniform represents the utility when all loca-
tions in synthetic traces are independently sampled from a
uniform distribution. Training represents the utility of the
training traces; i.e., the utility when we output the training
traces as synthetic traces without modification. Ideally, the
utility of the synthetic traces should be much better than
that of Uniform and close to that of Training.
Figure 7 shows that Proposal achieves TP-TV and TP-
TV-Top50 close to Training for a low re-identification
rate. For example, when the re-identification rate is required
to be less than 0.02, Proposal achieves TP-TV = 0.43 and
TP-TV-Top50 = 0.13, both of which are close to those of
Training (TP-TV = 0.39 and TP-TV-Top50 = 0.12).
In SGLT and SGD, the re-identification rate rapidly in-
creases with decrease in TP-TV and TP-TV-Top50. This
is because both SGLT and SGD synthesize traces by copy-
ing over some events from the training traces. Specifically,
SGLT (resp. SGD) increases the number of copied events
by decreasing parl (resp. increasing γ). Although a larger
number of copied events result in a decrease of both TP-TV
and TP-TV-Top50, they also result in the rapid increase of
the re-identification rate. This result is consistent with the
uniqueness of location data; e.g., only two (resp. three) loca-
tions are sufficient to uniquely characterize 50% (resp. 80%)
of the individuals among one and a half million people [18].
Figure 7 also shows that Proposal performs worse than
SGLT and SGD in terms of TM-EMD-X and TM-EMD-
Y. We consider that this is because Proposal modifies
the transition matrix so that it is consistent with a visit-
probability vector using the MH algorithm (SGLT and SGD
do not modify the transition matrix). It should be noted,
however, that Proposal significantly outperforms Uniform
with regard to TM-EMD-X and TM-EMD-Y. This means
that Proposal preserves the transition matrix well.
Analysis on cluster-specific features. Next, we show
the utility with regard to (d) the cluster-specific population
distribution. Specifically, we show in Figure 8 the frequency
distributions of training traces and synthetic traces and the
columns of factor matrices B and C for three clusters (we
set α = 200 because it provided almost the best utility in
Figure 7; we also normalized elements in each column of B
and C so that the square-sum is one). Recall that for each
cluster, we extracted the top 10% users; i.e., 50 users.
Figure 8 shows that the frequency distributions of training
traces differ from cluster to cluster, and that the users in
each cluster exhibit similar behavior; e.g., the users in (i)
stay in the northeastern area of Tokyo; the users in (ii) and
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Figure 7: Utility in PF. The number in SGLT rep-
resents the number c of clusters.
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Figure 8: Frequency distributions and the columns
of factor matrices B and C for three clusters (50
users for each cluster) in PF. The green line in (ii)
and the orange line in (iii) represent subways (Shin-
juku and Fukutoshin lines, respectively).
(iii) often use the subways. Proposal models such a cluster-
specific behavior via B and C, and synthesizes traces that
preserve the behavior using B and C. Figure 8 shows that
Proposal is useful for geo-data analysis such as modeling
human location patterns [39] and map inference [5, 40].
Scalability. We also measured the time to synthesize traces
from training traces. Here we generated one synthetic trace
from each training trace (500 synthetic traces in total), and
measured the time. We also changed the numbers of users
and locations (i.e., |U|, |X |) for various values from 100 to
1000 to see how the running time depends on |U| and |X |.
Figure 9 shows the results (we set α = 200 in Proposal,
and c = 100 and parl = 1 in SGLT; we also obtained almost
the same results for other values). Here we excluded the run-
ning time of SGD because it was very small; e.g., less than
one second when |U| = 1000 and |X | = 400 (we compare
the running time of Proposal with that of SGD in FS, as
described later). The running time of SGLT is much larger
than that of Proposal. Specifically, the running time of
SGLT is quadratic in |U| (e.g., when |X | = 400, SGLT(T)
requires 0.47 and 47 hours for |U| = 100 and 1000, respec-
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Figure 9: Running time in PF. “T” and “S” in the
parentheses represent the time to train a generative
model (i.e., MTF parameters in Proposal and se-
mantic clusters in SGLT) and the time to generate
500 synthetic traces, respectively.
tively) and cubic in |X | (e.g., when |U| = 100, SGLT(T)
requires 8.1 × 10−3 and 8.4 hours for |X | = 100 and 1000,
respectively). On the other hand, the running time of Pro-
posal is linear in |U| (e.g., Proposal(S) requires 6.3×10−5
and 5.9 × 10−4 hours for |U| = 100 and 1000, respectively)
and quadratic in |X | (e.g., Proposal(S) requires 9.3× 10−3
and 0.96 hours for |X | = 100 and 1000, respectively). This is
consistent with the time complexity described in Section 3.1.
From Figure 9, we can estimate the running time of SGLT
for generating large-scale traces. Specifically, when |U| =
219793 and |X | = 1000 as in IST of FS, SGLT(T) (se-
mantic clustering) would require about 4632 years (=8.4 ×
(219793/100)2/(365 × 24)). Even if we use 1000 nodes of
the ABCI (which has 1088 nodes [48]) in parallel, SGLT(T)
would require more than four years. Consequently, SGLT
cannot be applied to IST. Therefore, we compare Proposal
with SGD in FS.
4.5 Experimental Results in FS
Utility and privacy. In FS, we set α = 200 in Proposal
(as in Figures 8 and 9). In SGD, we set γ = 0 for the fol-
lowing two reasons: (1) the re-identification rate is high for
γ ≥ 1 in Figure 7 because of the uniqueness of location data
[18]; (2) the event in the first time slot is missing for many
users in FS, and cannot be copied. Note that SGD with
γ = 0 always passes the PD test because it generates syn-
thetic traces independently of the input data record [9]. We
evaluated all the utility measures for Proposal and SGD.
Figure 10 shows the results. The left graphs show Pro-
posal without the PD test, with k = 10, 100, or 200 in IST,
NYC, and TKY (we confirmed that the results of the other
cities were similar to those of NYC and TKY). The right
graphs show Proposal with k = 10 and SGD.
The left graphs show that all of the utility measures are
minimally affected by running the PD test with k = 10 in
all of the cities. Similarly, all of the utility measures are
minimally affected in IST, even when k = 200. We con-
firmed that about 70% of the synthetic traces passed the PD
test when k = 10, whereas only about 20% of the synthetic
traces passed the PD test when k = 200 (see Appendix E for
details). Nevertheless, Proposal significantly outperforms
Uniform in IST. This is because the number of users is
very large in IST (|U| = 219793). Consequently, even if the
PD test pass rate is low, many synthetic traces still pass the
test and preserve various statistical features.
The right graphs in Figure 10 show that for TP-TV and
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Figure 10: Utility of synthetic traces with (k, 1)-PD
in FS. The left graphs show the utility of Proposal
without the PD test, with k = 10, 100 or 200.
TP-TV-Top50, the performance of Proposal is roughly
the same as that of SGD. For TM-EMD-X and TM-
EMD-Y, Proposal outperforms SGD, especially in JK,
NYC, KL, and SP. This is because many missing events
exist in FS and the transitions in the training traces are few
in JK, NYC, KL, and SP (as described in Section 4.1).
A crucial difference between Proposal and SGD lies in
the fact that Proposal models the cluster-specific mobil-
ity features (i.e., both (c) and (d)), whereas SGD (γ = 0)
does not. This causes the results of VF-TV in Figure 10.
Specifically, for VF-TV, SGD performs almost the same
as Uniform, whereas Proposal significantly outperforms
SGD. Below we perform more detailed analysis to show
how well Proposal provides (c) and (d).
Analysis on cluster-specific features. First, we show in
Figure 11 the distributions of visit-fractions for four POI cat-
egories in NYC (Testing represents the distribution of test-
ing traces). The distribution of SGD concentrates at the
visit-fraction of 1/24 (i.e., 0 to 0.042). This is because SGD
(γ = 0) uses the transition matrix and visit-probability
vector common to all users, and synthesizes traces inde-
pendently of input training traces. Consequently, all users
spend almost the same amount of time on each POI cat-
egory. On the other hand, Proposal models a histogram
of visited locations for each user via the visit-count tensor,
and generates traces based on the user-specific feature. As
a result, the distribution of Proposal is similar to that of
Testing, and reflects the fact that about 30 to 35% of users
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Figure 11: Distributions of visit-fractions in NYC.
Proposal provides (10, 1)-PD.
spend less than 1/24 of their time at a park or bar, whereas
about 80% of users spend more than 1/24 of their time at
an office or university. This result explains the low values of
VF-TV in Proposal. Figure 11 also shows that the distri-
butions in Proposal are useful for semantic annotation of
POIs [19, 68].
Next, we visualize in Figure 12 the columns of factor ma-
trices B and D and training/synthetic traces for two clus-
ters. As with PF, the training users in each cluster exhibit
a similar behavior; e.g., the users in (i) enjoy great outdoors
and shopping at a mall, whereas the users in (ii) go to univer-
sities. Note that users and POIs in each cluster are seman-
tically similar; e.g., people who enjoy great outdoors also
enjoy shopping at a mall; many users in (ii) would be stu-
dents, faculty, or staff. The activity times are also different
between the two clusters. For example, we confirmed that
many training users in (i) enjoy great outdoors and shop-
ping from morning until night, whereas most training users
in (ii) are not at universities at night. Proposal models
such a behavior via factor matrices, and synthesizes traces
preserving the behavior. We emphasize that this feature is
useful for various analysis; e.g., modeling human location
patterns, semantic annotation of POIs.
SGD (γ = 0) and others [12, 13, 26] do not provide such
cluster-specific features because they generate traces only
based on parameters common to all users.
Scalability. Figure 13 shows the running time in FS. SGD
is much faster than Proposal. The reason for this lies in
the simplicity of SGD; i.e., SGD trains a transition ma-
trix for each time slot via maximum likelihood estimation;
it then synthesizes traces using the transition matrix. How-
ever, SGD does not generate cluster-specific traces. To gen-
erate such traces, Proposal is necessary.
DP for Θ. Finally, we evaluated the privacy budget ε in
DP for Θ and the utility by changing α in Proposition 1 from
10−6 and 103. Figure 14 shows the results in IST, where ε
is the value in Proposition 1 when κ = 0. In practice, ε can
be larger than this value because κ ≥ 0.
Figure 14 shows that ε needs to be larger than 105 to
provide high utility. We consider the reason for the large
value of ε as follows. First, ε tends to be very large for com-
plicated machine learning models in general. For example,
matrix factorization in [42] requires ε > 250 to provide high
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Figure 12: Two clusters in IST (21980 users for
each cluster). Here Proposal provides (10, 1)-PD.
For B and training/synthetic traces, we show the
top 5 POIs (numbers in the parentheses represent
POI IDs), whose values or frequencies from 10:00 to
12:00 are the highest. We also show the top 20 POIs
in the map by circles. Red circles in (i) (resp. (ii))
represent outdoors/malls (resp. universities).
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Figure 13: Running time in FS. “T”, “S”, and “P”
represent the time to train a generative model, syn-
thesize traces, and run the PD test, respectively.
utility. Deep learning in [60] requires ε > 6×105, as pointed
out in [52]. Since our MTF model is much more complicated
than matrix factorization, the required ε is larger than that
of [42].
Second, DP requires the MTF parameters Θ = (A,B,C,D)
to reveal almost no information about each user. Then ε can
be large for our generative model because the n-th row an in
A preserves some features specific to user un. We consider
that a different type of generative model than [8, 9] (which
outputs a synthetic trace y that resembles an input training
trace sn) needs to be used to achieve both a small ε and
utility in terms of (a)-(d). This is left for future work.
In contrast, (k, η)-PD can be achieved for reasonable k
and η because (k, η)-PD allows the synthetic trace y to re-
veal the information about the clusters of y as long as the
clusters are shared by many users. Note that it is still diffi-
cult to infer the clusters of sn from y because the linkage of
sn and y is prevented by PD.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed PPMTF, which is the first to
provide all of the utility ((a)-(d)), privacy, and scalability,
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Figure 14: Relation between ε and utility in IST
(κ = 0).
to our knowledge. As future work, we would like to design
a location synthesizer that provides ε-DP with a small ε to
more strongly protect user privacy.
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APPENDIX
A. NOTATIONS
Table 1 shows the basic notations used in this paper.
B. TIME COMPLEXITY
Now we describe details of the time complexity of the
proposed method described in Section 3. We assume that
we generate a synthetic trace from each training trace sn ∈ S
(i.e., |U| synthetic traces in total) and perform the PD test
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for each synthetic trace. We also assume that λI, ρI, λII,
ρII, z, and |U∗| are constants (note that typically λI, ρI 
|X| × |X |, λII, ρII  |X| × |L|, and z  min(|U|, |X |), as
described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3; a small value of |U∗| is
also used for a fast PD test, as described in Section 3.5).
In step (i), we simply count the number of transitions
and the number of visits from a training trace set S. Conse-
quently, the computation time of this step is much smaller
than that of the remaining four steps.
In step (ii), we first randomly sample ρI and ρII zero ele-
ments for each user in RI and RII, respectively. This can be
done in O(|U|) time in total by using a sampling technique
in [24]. Subsequently, we train the MTF parameters Θ via
Gibbs sampling. The computation time of Gibbs sampling
can be expressed as O(|U|+ |X |+ |L|).
In steps (iii) and (iv), we generate synthetic traces via the
MH algorithm. Step (iii) is dominated by computation of
the transition-probability matrices Q∗n, Qn,1, · · · ,Qn,|L| for
each training trace sn, which takes O(|U||X |2|L|) time in
total. Step (iv) requires O(|U||X ||L|) time.
For step (v), assume that we use the faster version of Pri-
vacy Test 1 (described in Section 3.5). Then we compute
the transition-probability matrices Q∗m, Qm,1, · · · ,Qm,|L|
for each training trace sm ∈ S∗, which takes O(|X |2|L|)
time in total. Subsequently, we check whether k′ ≥ k for
each training trace sn ∈ S, which takes O(|U||X ||L|) time
in total.
In summary, the time complexity of the proposed method
can be expressed as O(|U||X |2|L|).
C. MOREDETAILSONTHEEXPERIMEN-
TAL SET-UP
SGD. SGD [9] is a synthetic generator for any kind of data,
which works as follows: (i) Train the dependency structure
(graph) between data attributes; (ii) Train conditional prob-
abilities for each attribute given its parent attributes; (iii)
Generate a synthetic data record from an input data record
by copying the top γ ∈ Z≥0 attributes from the input data
record and generating the remaining attributes using the
trained conditional probabilities. Note that the dependency
structure and the conditional probabilities are common to
all users.
We applied SGD to synthesis of location traces as follows.
We regarded an event as an attribute, and a location trace
of length |T | as a data record with |T | attributes. Then it
would be natural to consider that the dependency structure
is given by the time-dependent Markov chain model as in
Proposal and SGLT, and the conditional probabilities are
given by the transition matrix for each time slot. In other
words, we need not train the dependency structure; i.e., we
can skip (i).
We trained the transition matrix for each time slot (|L|×
|X | × |X | elements in total) and the visit-probability vector
for the first time instant (|X | elements in total) from the
training traces via maximum likelihood estimation. Then we
synthesized a trace from an input training trace by copying
the first γ events and by generating the remaining events
using the transition matrix. When γ = 0, we generated a
location at the first time instant using the visit-probability
vector.
Note that we did not add the Laplacian noise to the tran-
sition matrices and the visit-probability vector (unlike [9])
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Figure 15: Reconstruction errors (sum of the l1 loss)
in RI and RII (TKY). “O” and “U” in the paren-
theses represent observed elements and unobserved
elements, respectively.
because the parameters of the generative model can be kept
secret or discarded, as in [8] (see Section 1).
Re-identification algorithm. We used the Bayesian re-
identification algorithm in [45]. Specifically, we first trained
the transition matrix for each training user from the train-
ing traces via maximum likelihood estimation. Then we re-
identified each synthetic trace by selecting a training user
whose posterior probability of being the input user is the
highest. Here we computed the posterior probability by us-
ing the transition matrix and assuming a uniform prior. See
[45] for more details.
D. EFFECT OF SHARING A AND B
The proposed method (Proposal) shares the factor ma-
trices A and B between two tensors. Here we show the ef-
fects of sharing them. Specifically, we compare the proposed
method with a method that independently factorizes each
tensor; i.e., factorizes RI into factor matrices AI ∈ R|U|×z,
BI ∈ R|X|×z, CI ∈ R|X|×z, and RII into factor matrices
AII ∈ R|U|×z, BII ∈ R|X|×z, DII ∈ R|L|×z, respectively.
We train these factor matrices via Gibbs sampling. Then
we generate synthetic traces via the MH algorithm in the
same way as Proposal. We denote this method by ITF
(Independent Tensor Factorization).
We compare Proposal with ITF using the Foursquare
dataset (FS). Here we selected Tokyo (TKY) as a city (we
also evaluated the other cities and obtained similar results).
We used the same parameters as those described in Sec-
tion 4.2. Then we evaluated the reconstruction errors of RI
and RII. Specifically, we evaluated the sum of the l1-loss
(absolute error) between RI and RˆI. We first evaluated the
sum of the l1-loss for observed elements (i.e., positive ele-
ments or zero elements treated as 0s). Then we evaluated
the sum of the l1-loss for unobserved elements (i.e., zero
elements treated as missing). Note that the number of un-
observed elements is very large. Specifically, let ξI ∈ Z≥0
be the total number of unobserved elements in RI. Then ξI
is close to |U| × |X | × |X | (= 47956× 1000× 1000) because
RI is very sparse (note that λI = 102 and ρI = 103, as de-
scribed in Section 4.2). Thus, we randomly selected 1000
unobserved elements for each user and evaluated the sum of
the l1-loss for the selected elements. Then we multiplied the
l1-loss by
ξI
1000|U| to estimate the l1-loss for all of the unob-
served elements. We evaluated the l1-loss for the observed
and unobserved elements in RII in the same way. We also
evaluated all of the utility measures in Section 4.3.
Figure 15 shows the reconstruction errors in RI and RII.
Proposal significantly outperforms ITF with regard to the
reconstruction error of unobserved elements in RI. This is
because RI (which includes 47956×1000×1000 elements) is
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Figure 16: Utility of Proposal and ITF (TKY).
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Figure 17: Relationship between k and the PD test
pass rate.
much more sparse than RII (which includes 47956×1000×24
elements) and RII compensates for the sparseness of RI in
Proposal by sharing A and B. This is consistent with
the experimental results in [64], where multiple tensor fac-
torization works well especially when one of two tensors is
extremely sparse.
Figure 16 shows the utility of Proposal and ITF (here
we do not run the PD test; even if we use the (10, 1)-PD
test, the utility of Proposal is hardly changed, as shown
in Figure 10). Proposal significantly outperforms ITF in
terms of VF-TV. We consider that this is because Pro-
posal trains A and B, which model the similarity structure
among users and locations, respectively, more accurately by
sharing them between RI and RII. Consequently, Proposal
generates user-specific (or cluster-specific) traces more effec-
tively.
In summary, Proposal addresses the sparseness of RI and
achieves high utility by sharing factor matrices.
E. RELATIONSHIPBETWEENKANDTHE
PD TEST PASS RATE
Here we analyze the effect of k in (k, η)-PD on the perfor-
mance of the proposed method (Proposal) in more detail.
Specifically, we evaluate the PD test pass rate, which is the
proportion of synthetic traces that have passed the PD test
to all synthetic traces. We changed k from 1 to 200 in the
experiments using the Foursquare dataset (FS). We set the
other parameters to the same values as in Section 4 (e.g.,
η = 1, |U∗| = 32000).
Figure 17 shows the results obtained for six cities. The PD
test pass rate decreases with an increase in k. For example,
the PD test pass rate is about 70% when k = 10, whereas it
is about 20% when k = 200.
Note that when k = 200, the PD test pass rate of IST
(17.9%) is lower than that of NYC (26.9%), as shown in
Figure 17. Nevertheless, Proposal significantly outper-
forms Uniform with regard to all of the utility measures
in IST, as shown in Figure 10. This is because the number
of users is very large in IST (|U| = 219793). Consequently,
even if the PD test pass rate is low, many synthetic traces
still pass the test and preserve various statistical features.
F. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Let ε ∈ R≥0 be the value given by
ε = α((λI + ρI)(rImax + κ)
2 + (λII + ρII)(rIImax + κ)
2). (9)
By (4), the logarithm of p(Θ|R) can be written as follows:
ln p(Θ|R)
= ln p(R|Θ) + ln p(Θ)− ln p(R) (by Bayes’ theorem)
=
|U|∑
n=1
|X|∑
i=1
|X|∑
j=1
IIn,i,j lnN (rIn,i,j |rˆIn,i,j , α−1)
+
|U|∑
n=1
|X|∑
i=1
|L|∑
j=1
IIIn,i,j lnN (rIIn,i,j |rˆIIn,i,j , α−1)
+ ln p(Θ)− ln p(R) (by (4))
=−
|U|∑
n=1
|X|∑
i=1
|X|∑
j=1
IIn,i,j
(
α(rIn,i,j − rˆIn,i,j)2
2
+ ln
√
α
2pi
)
−
|U|∑
n=1
|X|∑
i=1
|L|∑
j=1
IIIn,i,j
(
α(rIIn,i,j − rˆIIn,i,j)2
2
+ ln
√
α
2pi
)
+ ln p(Θ)− ln p(R). (10)
Let G be a function that takes as input two tensors R
and the MTF parameters Θ and outputs G(R,Θ) ∈ R as
follows:
G(R,Θ) =
|U|∑
n=1
|X|∑
i=1
|X|∑
j=1
αIIn,i,j(r
I
n,i,j − rˆIn,i,j)2
2
+
|U|∑
n=1
|X|∑
i=1
|L|∑
j=1
αIIIn,i,j(r
II
n,i,j − rˆIIn,i,j)2
2
− ln p(Θ). (11)
Note that ln
√
α
2pi
and ln p(R) in (10) do not depend on Θ.
Thus, by (11), ln p(Θ|R) in (10) can be expressed as follows:
p(Θ|R) = exp[−G(R,Θ)]∫
Θ
exp[−G(R,Θ)]dΘ . (12)
Then, Proposition 1 can be proved by using the fact that
FPPMTF is the exponential mechanism [21] that uses−G(R,Θ)
as a utility function. Specifically, let R′ be the tuple of two
tensors that differ from R at most one user’s elements; i.e.,
R and R′ are neighboring. We write R ∼ R′ to represent
that R and R′ are neighboring. Let ∆G ∈ R be the sensi-
tivity of G given by:
∆G = max
Θ
max
R,R′:R∼R′
|G(R,Θ)−G(R′,Θ)|. (13)
Note that in (11), IIn,i,j (resp. I
II
n,i,j) takes 1 at most λ
I + ρI
(resp. λII + ρII) elements for each user, as described in Sec-
tion 3.3. In addition, rIn,i,j ∈ [0, rImax], rIIn,i,j ∈ [0, rIImax],
rˆIn,i,j ∈ [−κ, rImax + κ], and rˆIIn,i,j ∈ [−κ, rIImax + κ] for each
triple (n, i, j), as described in Section 3.5. Moreover, the
“retry if fail” procedure, which iterates the sampling of Θ
until rˆIn,i,j and rˆ
II
n,i,j are bounded as above, guarantees that
Θ is sampled from the posterior distribution under this con-
straint [42].
Consequently, by (9), the sum of the first and second
terms in (11) is less than (resp. more than) or equal to ε
2
in
(resp. 0). Then, since the third term in (11) is the same for
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G(R,Θ) and G(R′,Θ) in (13), ∆G can be bounded above
by ε
2
: i.e., ∆G ≤ ε
2
.
Finally, we show that the ratio between p(Θ = FPPMTF (R))
and p(Θ = FPPMTF (R′) is bounded above by eε. Note
that by (12), p(Θ = FPPMTF (R)) = p(Θ|R) > 0 and
p(Θ = FPPMTF (R′)) = p(Θ|R′) > 0. Then we obtain:
p(Θ = FPPMTF (R))
p(Θ = FPPMTF (R′))
=
exp[−G(R,Θ)]∫
Θ exp[−G(R,Θ)]dΘ
exp[−G(R′,Θ)]∫
Θ exp[−G(R′,Θ)]dΘ
(by (12))
=
exp[−G(R,Θ)]
exp[−G(R′,Θ)] ·
∫
Θ
exp[−G(R′,Θ)]dΘ∫
Θ
exp[−G(R,Θ)]dΘ
= exp[−G(R,Θ) +G(R′,Θ)] ·
∫
Θ
exp[−G(R′,Θ)]dΘ∫
Θ
exp[−G(R,Θ)]dΘ
≤e ε2 · e ε2 ·
∫
Θ
exp[−G(R,Θ)]dΘ∫
Θ
exp[−G(R,Θ)]dΘ ((by (13) and ∆G ≤
ε
2
)
=eε,
which proves Proposition 1.
G. DETAILS OF GIBBS SAMPLING
We explain details of how to sample the hyper-parameters
Ψ and the MTF parameters Θ using Gibbs sampling.
In the t-th iteration, we sample Ψ
(t)
A , Ψ
(t)
B , Ψ
(t)
C , Ψ
(t)
D , A
(t),
B(t), C(t), and D(t) from the conditional distribution given
the current values of the other variables. Specifically, based
on the graphical model in Figure 4, we sample each variable
as follows:
Ψ
(t)
A ∼ p(ΨA|A(t−1)) (14)
Ψ
(t)
B ∼ p(ΨB|B(t−1)) (15)
Ψ
(t)
C ∼ p(ΨC|C(t−1)) (16)
Ψ
(t)
D ∼ p(ΨD|D(t−1)) (17)
A(t) ∼ p(A|R,B(t−1),C(t−1),D(t−1),Ψ(t)A ) (18)
B(t) ∼ p(B|R,A(t),C(t−1),D(t−1),Ψ(t)B ) (19)
C(t) ∼ p(C|RI,A(t),B(t),Ψ(t)C ) (20)
D(t) ∼ p(D|RII,A(t),B(t),Ψ(t)D ) (21)
Below we explain details of how to compute the sampling
distribution for the hyper-parameters and MTF parameters.
Sampling of the hyper-parameters. We explain the
computation of the right-hand side of (14) in Gibbs sam-
pling. We omit the computation of (15), (16), and (17)
because they are computed in the same way as (14); i.e.,
(15), (16), and (17) can be computed by replacing A in (14)
with B, C, and D, respectively. Below we omit superscripts
(t) and (t− 1).
p(ΨA|A) in (14) can be computed by using the fact that
the Normal-Wishart distribution is a conjugate prior of the
multivariate normal distribution [10]. Specifically, following
[57], we compute p(ΨA|A) in (14) as follows:
p(ΨA|A) = p(A|ΨA)p(ΨA)p(A) (by Bayes’ theorem)
= N (µA|µ∗0, (β∗0ΛA)−1)W(ΛA|W ∗0 , ν∗0 ), (22)
where
µ∗0 =
β0µ0+|U|a¯
β0+|U| (23)
β∗0 = β0 + |U| (24)
W ∗0 =
[
W−10 + |U|S¯ + β0|U|β0+|U| (µ0 − a¯)
>(µ0 − a¯)
]−1
(25)
ν∗0 = ν0 + |U| (26)
a¯ = 1|U|
|U|∑
n=1
an (27)
S¯ = 1|U|
|U|∑
n=1
a>n an. (28)
Therefore, we compute p(ΨA|A) by (22) to (28). Then we
sample ΨA from p(ΨA|A).
Sampling of the MTF parameters. Next we explain the
computation of (18) and (20). We omit the computation of
(19) and (21) because they are computed in the same way
as (18) and (20), respectively; i.e., (19) and (21) can be
computed by exchanging A for B in (18), and C for D in
(20).
p(A|R,B,C,D,ΨA) in (18) can be written as follows:
p(A|R,B,C,D,ΨA) =
|U|∏
n=1
p(an|RIn,RIIn ,B,C,D,ΨA),
(29)
where RIn and R
II
n are the n-th matrices in R
I and RII,
respectively. By Bayes’ theorem and the graphical model in
Figure 4, p(an|RIn,RIIn ,B,C,D,ΨA) in (29) can be written
as follows:
p(an|RIn,RIIn ,B,C,D,ΨA)
=
p(RIn,R
II
n |an,B,C,D,ΨA)p(an|B,C,D,ΨA)
p(RIn,RIIn |B,C,D,ΨA)
=
p(RIn|an,B,C)p(RIIn |an,B,D)p(an|ΨA)
p(RIn,RIIn |B,C,D,ΨA) . (30)
Note that p(RIn|an,B,C), p(RIIn |an,B,D), and p(an|ΨA)
are normal distributions (as described in Section 3.3), and
p(RIn,R
II
n |B,C,D,ΨA) is a normalization constant so that
the sum of p(an|RIn,RIIn ,B,C,D,ΨA) over all values of an
is one. In addition, let bcij ∈ Rz and bdij ∈ Rz are short-
hand for bi ◦cj and bi ◦dj , respectively, where ◦ represents
the Hadamard product. Then by (3), rˆIn,i,j and rˆ
II
n,i,j can be
expressed as: rˆIn,i,j = a
>
nbcij and rˆ
II
n,i,j = a
>
nbdij , respec-
tively.
Thus, p(an|RIn,RIIn ,B,C,D,ΨA) can be expressed as:
p(an|RIn,RIIn ,B,C,D,ΨA)
=d1 exp
[ |X|∑
i=1
|X|∑
j=1
αIIn,i,j(a
>
nbcij − rIn,i,j)2
+
|X|∑
i=1
|L|∑
j=1
αIIIn,i,j(a
>
nbdij − rIIn,i,j)2
+ (an − µA)>ΛA(an − µA)
]
, (31)
where d1 ∈ R is a normalization constant.
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To simplify (29) and (31), we use the following two facts.
First, for any v ∈ R and any w ∈ Rz, we obtain:
v2 = v(w−1>w)(w>w−1)v
= ((vw−1)>w)(w>(vw−1))
= (vw−1)>(ww>)(vw−1)) (by associativity).
Thus,
(a>nbcij − rIn,i,j)2
=(an − rIn,i,jbc−1ij )>(bcijbc>ij)(an − rIn,i,jbc−1ij )
and
(a>nbdij − rIIn,i,j)2
=(an − rIIn,i,jbd−1ij )>(bdijbd>ij)(an − rIIn,i,jbd−1ij ).
Therefore, we obtain:
p(an|RIn,RIIn ,B,C,D,ΨA)
=d2
|X|∏
i=1
|X|∏
j=1
N (an|rIn,i,jbc−1ij , (αIIn,i,jbcijbc>ij)−1)
·
|X|∏
i=1
|L|∏
j=1
N (an|rIIn,i,jbd−1ij , (αIIIn,i,jbdijbd>ij)−1)
· N (an|µA,Λ−1A ), (32)
where d2 ∈ R is a normalization constant.
Second, the product of two Gaussian densities is pro-
portional to a Gaussian density [53]. Specifically, for any
w ∈ Rz, any m1,m2 ∈ Rz, and any Λ1,Λ2 ∈ Rz×z, we
obtain:
N (w|m1,Λ−11 ) · N (w|m2,Λ−12 ) = d3N (w|mc,Λ−1c ), (33)
where
d3 = N (m1|m2,Λ−11 + Λ−12 )
mc = (Λ1 + Λ2)
−1(Λ1m1 + Λ2m2)
Λc = Λ1 + Λ2. (34)
By (32), (33), and (34), p(A|R,B,C,D,ΨA) in (29) can be
written as follows:
p(A|R,B,C,D,ΨA) =
|U|∏
n=1
N (an|µ∗A,n,Λ∗A,n), (35)
where
Λ∗A,n = ΛA + αI
I
n,i,j
|X|∑
i=1
|X|∑
j=1
(bcijbc
>
ij) (36)
+ αIIIn,i,j
|X|∑
i=1
|L|∑
j=1
(bdijbd
>
ij)
µ∗A,n = [Λ
∗
A,n]
−1
ΛAµA + αIIn,i,j |X|∑
i=1
|X|∑
j=1
rIn,i,jbcij
+ αIIIn,i,j
|X|∑
i=1
|L|∑
j=1
rIIn,i,jbdij
 . (37)
Similarly, p(C|RI,A,B,ΨC) in (20) can be written as fol-
lows:
p(C|RI,A,B,ΨC) =
|X|∏
j=1
p(cj |RI,A,B,ΨC)
=
|X|∏
j=1
N (cj |µ∗C,j ,Λ∗C,j), (38)
where
Λ∗C,j = ΛC + αI
I
n,i,j
|U|∑
n=1
|X|∑
i=1
abniab
>
ni (39)
µ∗C,j = [Λ
∗
C,j ]
−1
ΛCµC + αIIn,i,j |U|∑
n=1
|X|∑
i=1
rIn,i,jabni

(40)
and abni is shorthand for an ◦bi. Thus we compute p(A|R,
B,C,D,ΨA) and p(C|RI,A,B,ΨC) by (35) to (37) and
(38) to (40), respectively. Then we sample A and C from
these distributions.
19
